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I study credence goods markets when there are both selsh and conscientious
experts. The selsh expert is a prot maximizer. The conscientious expert wants to
maximize prot and repair the consumer's problem. There are two classes of equi-
libria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price equilibria. A consumer cannot
infer the expert's type from his price list in a uniform-price equilibrium but can do
that in a nonuniform-price equilibrium. When the fraction of the conscientious ex-
pert is small, the selsh expert will be honest about the severity of the consumer's
problem. When the fraction of the conscientious expert is large, the selsh expert
will cheat the consumer; overcharging the consumer whenever he oers to repair the
problem. Finally, more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss.
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11 Introduction
This article examines credence goods markets. A credence good is one whose quality
cannot be evaluated by the buyer even after the buyer has consumed it (Darby, 1973).
Suppose that the brake in your car is not working properly. A mechanic tells you that your
brake 
uid reservoir is leaking and recommends you to replace it and rell the brake 
uid.
Suppose that you accept the oer. Indeed, after the repair, the brake works properly.
You never get to nd out whether a simple rell could have been sucient to solve the
problem. In addition, you may not be able to verify whether the 
uid reservoir has been
replaced as promised.
Asymmetric information in credence goods markets allows an expert to exploit a con-
sumer by exaggerating the problem. The existing literature studies market outcomes
when experts are pure prot maximizers. In reality, most of us have met experts whose
behavior is not consistent with prot maximization. Harvard Medical School asks stu-
dents to pair with patients. Each medical student follows along on the patient's visits
to her specialists. The objective of the exercise is that walking in patients' shoes may
teach students to care. Time magazine comments on this, saying, \At Harvard and other
medical schools across the country, educators are beginning to realize that empathy is as
valuable as any clinical skill."1 It is hard to believe that every student trained by this
doctrine will become a doctor who merely wants to maximize prot. In our academic
profession, we all know professors who spend considerable time advising students in the
summer. They could have instead worked on their own papers or gone for vacation with
families. What prot can they make by sacricing their time?
Psychologists and sociologists have recognized for a long time that job satisfaction
stems not only from nancial rewards but also from intrinsic motivations. Herzberg (1959)
1\Teaching Doctors to Care", TIME, May 29, 2006
2claims that a worker's motivation is related to two factors: motivators and hygiene. Moti-
vators include achievement, the work itself, recognition, responsibility and advancement.
The hygiene elements include salary, company policies, supervision, interpersonal rela-
tions and working conditions. Friedlander (1964), Ewen (1966), Wernimont (1966), and
Knoop (1994) show that motivators are positively correlated with job satisfaction and
have signicant in
uence on work performance.
As behavioral economics progresses, the limitation of the pure self-interested assump-
tion has raised more and more concerns. Various modications on this assumption have
been considered. Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) analyze the strategic and intertemporal
interaction between two economic agents who have altruistic concerns for each other's
welfare. Rabin (1993) incorporated fairness into game theory. In the fairness equilib-
ria, people want to be nice to those who treat them fairly but punish those who hurt
them. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) study the interaction between self-interested agents and
agents with a fairness concern. Alger and Ma (2003) analyze an optimal insurance con-
tract when some health care providers are collusive while some are honest about the
consumer's treatment cost. Benabou and Tirole (2003) study a worker's extrinsic and
intrinsic motivations.
This paper departs from the existing credence goods literature by including both self-
ish and conscientious types of expert in a market. The selsh expert is a prot maximizer.
The conscientious expert's utility comes from prot and repairing the consumer's problem.
This assumption has two interpretations. First, an expert may directly get satisfaction
from work itself as described by the psychology literature. Second, an expert may obtain
satisfaction from work indirectly through a reputation for competence. A newly estab-
lished car repair shop can build up a reputation of competence by solving consumers'
problems at a low price initially and can make a prot in the future through the good
reputation.
3I adopt the standard credence goods literature's framework and ask the following
research questions. How does the presence of a conscientious expert in
uence the selsh
expert's behavior? Can the consumer identify the type of the expert by either price lists
or recommendation strategies? Do more conscientious experts always result in a more
ecient market equilibrium?
In my model, there is a monopoly expert and a consumer. In line with Wolinsky
(1993), Fong (2005) and Emons (1997, 2001), it is assumed that the consumer has either
a minor problem or a serious problem, but he does not know which one it is. The novelty
of my model is that the expert can be one of two types: the conscientious type or the
selsh type. The expert knows his type and posts a price list for the possible repairs.
The consumer visits the expert; the expert learns the nature of the problem. Then the
expert either refuses to provide a repair or oers to repair the problem at a price chosen
from the posted prices. Upon hearing a recommendation, the consumer decides whether
to accept the repair oer. If the consumer accepts the repair oer, his problem is solved
at the quoted price.
I nd two classes of equilibria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price equi-
libria. In a uniform-price equilibrium, both types of expert post the same single price;
therefore, the consumer cannot distinguish the expert's type by price. The conscientious
expert repairs both problems, whereas the selsh expert only repairs the minor problem.
When the selsh expert treats the minor problem, he overcharges the consumer; that is,
he charges a price higher than the consumer's willingness to pay for the minor problem.
The intuition behind the uniform-price equilibria is the following. The single price re-
sults in a positive prot for the conscientious expert when the problem is minor and a
loss when the problem is serious, but he will repair both problems. If the conscientious
expert's prot from repairing the minor problem is high enough, the selsh expert will
mimic him by posting the same single price; the selsh expert will then repair the minor
4problem but reject the serious problem to avoid a loss.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the consumer can infer the expert's type by the
price lists. The conscientious expert posts a single price and repairs both problems. The
selsh expert posts dierent prices. He recommends the high price when the problem is
serious; he randomizes between recommending the high price and the low price when the
problem is minor. The consumer accepts the low price oer and rejects the high price
oer with a positive probability. The conscientious expert's single price is so low that the
selsh expert would not post that price even if the consumer accepts it with probability
one. The conscientious expert gets a high utility from repairing the problem. Hence, he
would not copy the selsh expert's price list, trading o a high acceptance rate for a high
prot. The consumer rejects the selsh expert's serious treatment oer with a positive
probability to prevent the selsh expert from always misreporting a minor problem as the
serious problem.
I select the most protable equilibrium for both types of expert for comparative statics.
This is for two reasons. First, the conscientious expert always repairs the consumer's prob-
lem in equilibrium. Besides satisfaction from repairing the problem, he also maximizes
prot. Second, a monopolist often has a stronger bargaining power against a consumer
and therefore the equilibrium is more likely to be in favor of the monopolist. When
the expert is very likely to be selsh, the most protable equilibrium is a nonuniform-
price equilibrium. When the expert is very likely to be conscientious, the most protable
equilibrium is a uniform-price equilibrium.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the expert's type is revealed. Once the consumer
can infer the expert's identity, the fraction of the conscientious expert, , does not play any
role in the nonuniform-price equilibrium. In contrast, the expert's prot in a uniform-
price equilibrium increases in . This is because when the expert is more likely to be
conscientious, upon hearing a recommendation the consumer believes that his problem is
5more likely to be serious. Hence, his willingness to pay is higher. When  is above some
threshold, the uniform-price equilibrium is the most protable equilibrium.
Are more conscientious experts always better in terms of eciency? To answer this
question, the eciency of the most protable equilibrium as a function of  is analyzed. In
my model, it is socially ecient to have both problems repaired. In both the nonuniform-
price and uniform-price equilibrium regimes the minor problem is always repaired. Any
social loss is due to an unsolved serious problem. When  increases, two eects in
uence
eciency. On the one hand, the consumer has a higher chance to see the conscientious
expert who will always repair the problem. This improves eciency. On the other hand,
when  increases, the market is more likely to be in the uniform-price equilibrium regime.
Here, the selsh expert free rides on the conscientious expert and behaves worse than in
the nonuniform-price equilibrium regime. This leads to a larger social loss. Because of the
two opposite eects, eciency is not monotonic in . When  is close to one of the two
extremes, 0 and 1, more conscientious experts will result in a smaller social loss. When 
is in a middle range, more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss.
Pitchik and Schotter (1987) study an expert's fraudulent behavior in a setting with
exogenously given prices. They found a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the expert
randomizes between lying and telling the truth. Emons (1997, 2001) assumes that con-
sumers can verify whether the recommended service is delivered by the expert. Hence,
cheating becomes costly. In his equilibrium, an expert never cheats. In my paper, the
consumer cannot verify whether the recommended service is performed and therefore the
selsh expert is more tempted to cheat.
Wolinsky (1993) studies market equilibrium in a competitive setting wherein the con-
sumer can consult multiple experts by incurring a search cost. He identies a specialization
equilibrium in which some experts repair a minor problem while others repair a serious
problem. In my model, there is a monopolist expert and the consumer does not search.
6A uniform-price equilibrium resembles Wolinsky's specialization equilibrium in the sense
that the selsh expert only repairs the minor problem and the conscientious expert repairs
both problems.
My article is closely related to Fong (2005). The main result in Fong is that the selsh
expert never misreports a minor problem as a serious one, but the consumer sometimes
rejects the serious treatment oer. The market ineciency results from the consumer's
rejection because the price is so high that it extracts the entire consumer surplus. My
paper models both selsh and conscientious experts. In contrast to Fong's result, I identify
another source of market ineciency stemming from the selsh expert's refusal to repair
the serious problem. The selsh expert does so because the price is too low to cover the
treatment cost for the serious problem. These results contrast strongly against those in
Fong (2005).
Other important studies about principal-agent model with multiple types of agents are
also related to my article. Alger and Renault (2006) study a principal-agent model when
the agent is either honest or opportunistic. An honest agent reports his ability truthfully to
the principal while an opportunistic agent may misreport his ability to maximize material
payo. They examine the optimal contract when the agent has two dimensional private
information: his type and his ability. My model is dierent from theirs in the following
ways. First, in their model, it is the uninformed party, the principal, moves rst by oering
a contract to the agent. In my model, it is the informed party, the expert, moves rst by
oering a price list. Second, the honest agent commits to reporting his ability truthfully
to the principal, while the conscientious expert does not commit to being honest about
the nature of the consumer's problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 derives the uniform-price and nonuniform-price equilibria. Section 4 analyzes market
eciency as a function of . Section 5 discusses market equilibrium in a competitive
7setting. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Players and payo functions
There are two players in the model, a monopoly expert and a consumer. The consumer
has either a serious problem or a minor problem. The problem is serious with probability
, with  2 (0;1). Let s denote the serious problem and m denote the minor problem.
If problem i 2 fm;sg is left unresolved, the consumer suers a loss li, with lm < ls. The
consumer's utility of having the problem unrepaired is  li. If he accepts a repair oer at
p, his payo is  p.
The expert is either a conscientious type or a selsh type. The selsh expert only
cares about prot; his payo from repairing problem i at price p is p   ri, where ri is
the treatment cost for problem i, with rm < rs. The conscientious expert cares about
both prot and the consumer's well being; his payo from repairing problem i at price p is
p ri+kli, where k denotes the degree of conscientiousness. When k = 0, the conscientious
expert becomes the selsh expert. As k increases, the conscientious expert's utility from
repairing the problem rises. This paper studies what incentives a few conscientious experts
may create for the selsh experts; therefore, the conscientious expert's motive needs to be
suciently dierent from that of the selsh expert. Assume that k  rs
ls. When k  rs
ls,
the conscientious expert will repair the serious problem for free. An expert's payo is zero
if he does not repair the problem.
In line with earlier literature, the assumption is that it is ecient to repair both
problems, i.e., 0 < ri < li;i 2 fm;sg. Let E(l)  ls + (1   )lm. The equilibria under
the condition E(l) < rs are analyzed in sections 3 and 4. The case of E(l) > rs is discussed
8in section 5.
2.2 Information structure
It is common knowledge that the consumer has a serious problem with probability ,
with 0 <  < 1, and that the expert is a conscientious type with probability , with
0 <  < 1. The consumer knows that he has a problem but does not know if it is serious
or minor. After diagnosing the problem, the expert learns whether it is serious or minor,
but this remains his private information. If the expert repairs the problem i 2 fm;sg, the
consumer only knows that his problem is solved but does not know which treatment cost
ri is incurred. Implicitly, I have assumed that the resolution of a problem is a veriable
or contractible event, but the type of repair for the resolution is not.
2.3 Extensive form
I consider the following extensive form game.
 Stage 1: Nature decides the severity of the consumer's problem, li;i 2 fm;sg, and
the expert's type, according to the probabilities  and  respectively.
 Stage 2: Nature informs the expert of his type; this information is unknown to the
consumer. Then the expert posts a price list (pm;ps), with pm  ps.
 Stage 3: The expert observes the severity of the consumer's problem; the severity
is unknown to the consumer. The expert either declines to repair the consumer's
problem, or oers to treat the consumer at a price taken from his price list (pm;ps).
 Stage 4: If a price pi is oered by the expert, the consumer decides whether to
accept the repair oer. If the consumer accepts, he pays the price pi, a repair is
performed and the problem is resolved.
93 The equilibria
To simplify the analysis, the expert is restricted to post only prices that are recommended
with a positive probability. An expert will never set a price below rm or above ls. Any
price p > ls will be rejected by the consumer. Any price p < rm will be accepted by the
consumer but will generate a smaller prot than p0 = p + , for a suciently small  > 0.
Therefore experts are restricted to posting their prices in the range of [rm;ls].
One degenerate case of my model is when there is only a selsh expert,  = 0. This is
studied by Fong (2005). This unique equilibrium is presented in Proposition 0.
Proposition 0. When the expert is always selsh ( = 0), there always exists a unique
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome not involving weakly dominated strategies. In the
equilibrium, the expert posts a price list (lm;ls). He recommends lm in state m and rec-
ommends ls in state s. A consumer accepts lm with probability one and accepts ls with
probability lm rm
ls rm .
Proof. Refer to Proposition 1 in Fong (2005).
Recall that in this and the next sections, I assume E(l) < rs. The condition E(l) < rs
implies rm < lm < rs < ls. The expert can raise pm up to lm, the consumer's willingness
to pay for the minor problem, because any pm less than lm is accepted regardless of the
consumer's belief about the severity of his problem. Raising the price for the serious
problem ps has two eects. A higher ps results in a higher prot margin for repairing
the serious problem. Meanwhile, a higher ps may trigger a higher rejection rate by the
consumer because the consumer knows that the expert has an incentive to misreport the
minor problem as the serious problem when ps is high. The gain in prot margin dominates
the loss of rejection. Hence, the expert will set ps to ls, the consumer's willingness to
pay for the serious problem. In Fong's model, the continuation game after each price
10list is a proper subgame. The equilibrium in Proposition 0 gives the selsh expert the
highest prot among all the subgames and therefore is the unique subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium.
In Fong's equilibrium, the expert recommends lm when the problem is minor and ls
when it is serious. This no cheating result is driven by the high price ps = ls. When
the price for repairing the serious problem, ps, is so high that it extracts all the surplus
of repairing the serious problem, the consumer will reject this oer completely if the
expert lies with an arbitrarily small probability. Rejection by the consumer is the source
of ineciency. However, it is this rejection that disciplines the expert's behavior and
supports the equilibrium.
Now the model is studied with both selsh and conscientious types of expert; that is,
 2 (0;1). Two classes of equilibrium outcomes are identied: uniform-price equilibrium
outcomes and nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 1. (Uniform-price Equilibria). There is a continuum of equilibrium out-
comes in which both types of expert post the same single price. An equilibrium outcome is
indexed by p 2 [lm;p]; with p =
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) . In such an equilibrium, both types of expert
post a single price p. The conscientious expert always oers to repair the problem at price
p. The selsh expert oers to repair the minor problem at price p; he declines to repair
the serious problem. The consumer always accepts the repair oer p.
When both types of expert post the same price list p, the consumer cannot infer the
identity of the expert from a repair oer at p. Given the expert's equilibrium strategy,
the consumer updates his belief about having a serious problem by Bayes' rule after
recommended p; his expected loss from the problem is E(ljp) =
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) . Since E(ljp)
is at least the price charged by the expert, the consumer will accept this repair oer.
11A uniform-price equilibrium is supported by the following consumer beliefs after an
o-equilibrium repair oer p0 6= p. If p0 < p, the consumer believes that the expert is
conscientious and, accordingly, his problem is serious with probability , the prior. If
p0 > p, the consumer believes that the expert is selsh. In addition, his belief about the
nature of the problem depends on the comparison between p0 and rs. If p < p0 < rs, the
consumer believes that his problem is minor; if rs  p0  ls, he believes that the problem
is serious with probability .
I call the consumer with such beliefs a pessimist in the sense that he regards the expert
as selsh if he is recommended an o-equilibrium price higher than the equilibrium price.
The pessimist's beliefs can be justied by the following argument: When the conscientious
expert's benet from repairing the problem is suciently large, he will not bear the risk of
rejection in exchange for a higher prot by raising the repair oer above p. In comparison
with the conscientious expert, the selsh expert has a stronger incentive to deviate to a
price above p.
The model requires that the consumer's belief about the nature of the problem must
be consistent with his belief about the expert's type. A conscientious expert will always
repair the consumer's problem. Hence, the consumer will not update his belief about
the nature of the problem if he is recommended p0 < p. When p0 is greater than p, the
consumer believes that the expert is the selsh type who will not repair the problem when
the quoted price is smaller than the treatment cost. Hence, when p0 is smaller than rs,
the serious treatment cost, the consumer believes that he has a minor problem. When
p0 is at least rs, the selsh expert will always oer to repair a problem at p0. Hence, the
consumer's belief about having a serious problem remains the prior, .
According to the consumer's o-equilibrium beliefs, he will accept a repair oer below
p and reject a repair oer above p. The consumer accepts p in equilibrium. Clearly, he
will accept p0 lower than p if p0 is oered by the conscientious expert. If the consumer is
12recommended p0 2 (p; rs), his expected loss, lm; is smaller than p0, therefore he will reject
such a repair oer. If the consumer is recommended p0  rs, his expected loss E(l), which
is less than rs, is smaller than p0. Hence, the consumer will reject this repair oer as well.
Given the consumer's optimal strategy after a repair oer p0, there is no protable price
deviation for both types of expert.
The condition E(l) < rs implies that p is higher than the treatment cost for the minor
problem and lower than the treatment cost for the serious problem. The conscientious
expert commits to repair the problem even if it turns out to be serious. The selsh
expert will decline to treat the serious problem and overcharge the consumer for the
minor problem; that is, the selsh expert charges the consumer a price higher than his
loss from the minor problem if the problem is indeed minor.
The class of the uniform-price equilibria survive the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. The
conscientious expert cannot deviate to a higher price and convince the consumer to accept
the deviation. Suppose the conscientious expert deviates to p0 > p. The most favorable
reaction he can expect from the consumer is to accept p0 with probability one. However,
if the consumer accepts p0 with probability one, the selsh expert will also deviate to
oering p0. By the same logic, the selsh expert cannot deviate to a higher price and
convince the consumer to accept the price.
The upper bound of the uniform equilibrium price is
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) , which increases in
both  and . When the expert is more likely to be conscientious or the consumer is
more likely to have a serious problem, the expected loss from the problem conditional
on the recommendation p is higher. The consumer's willingness to pay becomes higher
accordingly. When , the fraction of the conscientious expert, is one, the expert will
charge E(l) and always repair the consumer's problem. This equilibrium is ecient and
allows the expert to take away the entire social surplus.
The existence of the conscientious expert creates an incentive for the selsh expert to
13cream skim the consumer with a minor problem and dump the consumer with a serious
problem. The unsolved serious problem creates a social loss due to the fact that the
uniform price is too low for the selsh expert to cover the serious treatment cost. This
result is in sharp contrast to Fong's equilibrium. In Fong, it is the consumer who some-
times rejects the serious problem treatment oer and creates a social loss. The rationale
behind the consumer's rejection is that the price for the serious problem is so high that if
the consumer accepts it with probability one, the selsh expert will always misreport the
minor problem as the serious one.
Uniform-price equilibrium outcomes are ranked by eciency and protability in Corol-
lary 1 and Corollary 2, respectively.
Corollary 1. Uniform-price equilibrium outcomes are equally ecient.
Under the condition ri < li;i 2 fm;sg, it is socially ecient to have both problems
repaired. I measure market ineciency as the social loss from an unresolved problem. In a
uniform-price equilibrium, a minor problem is always repaired whereas a serious problem
remains unresolved with probability 1   . The social ineciency of a uniform-price
equilibrium is therefore (1 )(ls  rs). The distinctions among unform-price equilibria
are the distributions of wealth between the consumer and the expert.
Corollary 2. The most protable uniform-price equilibrium outcome is one in which both
types of expert post a single price p =
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) .
In a uniform-price equilibrium, both types of expert post the same price p in [lm;p],
and the consumer always accepts a repair oer at p. Clearly, both types of expert's prots
reach the maximum at p.
Thus far, the equilibria in which both types of expert post the same price are charac-
terized. Next, I will characterize other equilibria in which dierent type of expert posts a
dierent price list.
14Proposition 2. (Nonuniform-price Equilibria) There is a continuum of equilibrium out-
comes in which each type of expert posts a dierent price list. An equilibrium outcome
is indexed by ps 2 [rs;ls] and pc 2 [lm;pc], with pc = lm + 
1 (ps   rs)(lm rm
ps rm). In the
equilibrium, the selsh expert posts a price list (lm;ps). In state s, the selsh expert oers
to repair the problem at ps; in state m, he oers to repair the problem at ps with probability
 =
(ls ps)
(1 )(ps lm), and repair the problem at lm with probability 1   . The conscientious
expert posts a single price pc, and always oers to repair the problem at pc. The consumer
accepts lm and pc with probability one; he accepts ps with probability 
 = lm rm
ps rm.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the expert's identity is revealed by his price list. If
recommended a single price pc, the consumer knows the expert is conscientious and the
consumer believes that his problem is serious with probability , the prior. Because the
expected loss from the problem, E(l), is greater than pc, the consumer will always accept a
repair oer at pc. If recommended a price from the price list (lm;ps), the consumer knows
that he is seeing the selsh expert, who recommends ps when the problem is serious and
randomizes between recommending ps and lm with probabilities  and 1 , respectively,
when the problem is minor. Clearly, the consumer is indierent between accepting and
rejecting a repair oer at lm. Accepting lm with probability one is his best response. The
selsh expert's probability of lying, , makes the consumer indierent between accepting
and rejecting a repair oer at ps. Hence, accepting ps with probability 
 is the consumer's
best response.
A nonuniform-price equilibrium is supported by the consumer's beliefs after an o-
equilibrium price p0 = 2 fpcg
S
f(lm;ps)g is recommended. If p0 < pc, the consumer believes
that the expert is conscientious with probability one and the problem is serious with
probability . If p0 > pc, the consumer believes that the expert is selsh. In addition, he
believes that his problem is minor for p0 2 (pc;rs) and is serious with probability  for
15p0 2 [rs;ls]. The justication for the consumer's beliefs after a repair oer p0 > pc is the
same as in the analysis for Proposition 1. According to the consumer's beliefs, his optimal
strategy in the continuation game following p0 is to accept p0 < pc and reject p0 > pc.
Given the consumer and the conscientious expert's equilibrium strategies, the selsh
expert does not have a protable deviation in price. The conscientious expert's prices,
pc, is so low that the selsh expert does not want to post pc although it is accepted with
probability one. Clearly, a price deviation less than pc is less protable than the selsh
expert's equilibrium price list, (lm;ps). A price deviation above pc will be rejected and
result in zero prot.
In the recommendation stage, the consumer accepts ps with probability 
, which makes
the selsh expert indierent between recommending ps and lm when the problem is indeed
minor. Hence, it is the selsh expert's best response to misreport the minor problem as the
serious problem with probability . The selsh expert recommends ps when the problem
is serious because ps is big enough to cover the serious treatment cost, rs.
Given the consumer and the selsh expert's strategies, the conscientious expert does
not have a protable deviation. The conscientious expert will not mimic the selsh ex-
pert's price list (lm;ps). A repair oer at ps is not attractive for the conscientious expert
because it will be rejected with a positive probability. A repair oer at lm will be ac-
cepted but is less protable than the conscientious expert's equilibrium repair oer, pc.
The conscientious expert will not deviate to a price other than the selsh expert's price
list. A price deviation p0 less than pc will be accepted but is less protable than pc. A
price deviation p0 above pc will be rejected and result in zero payo.
The set of nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes can be reduced by the Cho-Kreps
intuitive criterion.
Corollary 3. Nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes that satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive
16criterion are those in which the selsh expert posts (lm;ps), with ps 2 [rs;ls] and the
conscientious expert posts pc = pc = lm + 
1 (ps   rs)(lm rm
ps rm).
When the conscientious expert's price is pc, the selsh expert is indierent between
posting (lm;ps) and pc. Consider a nonuniform-price equilibrium outcome in which pc <
pc. The conscientious expert can deviate to posting pc
0 = pc + , with  positive but
arbitrarily close to zero. If the selsh expert recommends pc
0, the most favorable response
he can expect from the consumer is to accept pc
0 with probability one. Because pc
0 < pc,
the selsh expert's highest possible prot from recommending pc
0 is strictly less than
his equilibrium prot. Hence, the consumer should be convinced that he is seeing the
conscientious expert upon being recommended pc
0 and therefore should accept pc
0 with
probability one.
The Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion has reduced the set of nonuniform-price equilibrium
outcomes. All remaining nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes are indexed by ps, with
ps 2 [rs;ls]. In the following analysis, I characterize the eciency and protability of the
equilibrium outcomes that have survived the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.
Corollary 4. In the continuum of nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes, the most prof-
itable equilibrium outcome coincides with the most ecient equilibrium outcome. In the
equilibrium, the selsh expert posts a price list (lm;ls). He recommends lm when the prob-
lem is minor and recommends ls when it is serious. The conscientious expert posts a single
price pc and always recommends pc. The consumer accepts pc and lm with probability one;
he accepts ls with probability 
 = lm rm
ls rm .
The selsh expert's equilibrium strategies are the same as in Fong (2005)(See Propo-
sition 0). In a nonuniform-equilibrium outcome, the selsh expert's prot is
s(lm;ps) = (ps   rs)(
lm   rm
ps   rm
) + (1   )(lm   rm):
17Under the assumption E(l) < rs, s increases in ps. This is because as the selsh expert
raises ps, the gain in prot margin dominates the loss of rejection.
The conscientious expert always repairs the problem in a nonuniform-price equilib-
rium. Hence, his rank of the equilibrium outcomes is also determined by the prot. The
conscientious expert's prot is
c(pc) = pc   [rs + (1   )rm]:
Because pc increases in ps, c(pc) increases in ps as well. Therefore, both types of expert's
payos reach the maximum at ps = ls.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium outcome, the conscientious expert always repairs the
problem. The social loss results from the consumer's rejection of the serious treatment
recommendation, ps, oered by the selsh expert. The social loss of a nonuniform-price
equilibrium outcome is
W  (1   )[(ls   rs) + (1   )(lm   rm)](1   
);
where  is the selsh expert's probability of recommending ps when the problem is minor
and 





ps rm by their equilibrium values yields
W =
(1   )[ps(ls   rs   lm + rm) + lmrs   lsrm]
ps   rm
:
The derivative of W with respect to ps is  
(1 )(lm rm)(rs rm)
(ps rm)2 , which is negative. Hence,
the most ecient equilibrium outcome is the one in which ps = ls.
When ps increases, two con
icting forces are working on eciency. When ps gets
bigger, the consumer will reject ps more often; hence, the serious problem is less likely
18to be resolved. This leads to a larger social loss. However, when ps is higher, the selsh
expert is less likely to misreport the minor problem as the serious problem. Therefore,
the minor problem has a higher chance to be resolved. The eciency gain from the
minor problem exceeds the eciency loss from the serious problem; consequently, the
eciency increases in ps. The social loss of a nonuniform-price equilibrium results from
the interaction between the consumer and the selsh expert. In equilibrium, the selsh
expert takes the entire social surplus from repairing the problem when the repair oer is
accepted. Hence, the eciency of an equilibrium outcome is aligned with the protability
of the equilibrium outcome.
4 Are more conscientious experts always better?
Are more conscientious experts always better in terms of eciency? To answer this
question, I need to select an equilibrium outcome as a benchmark to see how the eciency
changes with the fraction of the conscientious expert, . The Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion
does not help with selecting among the multiple equilibria. I select the most protable
equilibrium outcome as the benchmark for two reasons. First, the conscientious expert
always repairs the problem in equilibrium. Hence, like the selsh expert, the conscientious
expert prefers the most protable equilibrium. Second, a monopolist often has stronger
bargaining power over a consumer. The equilibrium outcome is more likely to be in favor
of the expert.
Corollary 5. When  2 (0;  ), with   = [
(ls lm)(ls rm)
(ls rs)(lm rm)   ] 1, the most protable equi-
librium outcome is the nonuniform-price equilibrium outcome described in Corollary 2.
When  2 ( ;1], the most protable equilibrium outcome is the uniform-price equilibrium
outcome described in Corollary 4. When  = , the expert's prot in Corollary 2 is equal
to his prot in Corollary 4.
19To select the most protable equilibrium outcome, it is sucient to compare the
expert's prot in Corollary 2, the most protable uniform-price equilibrium, and Corollary
4, the most protable nonuniform-price equilibrium.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the consumer can identify the expert's type from
his price list. Once the expert's identity is revealed, the fraction of the conscientious
expert, , does not play any role in the equilibrium. Therefore, the prot of the expert in
Corollary 4 does not depend on . In contrast, the expert's prot in Corollary 2 increases
in . This is because in the uniform-price equilibrium, when the expert is more likely
to be conscientious, the consumer's probability of having a serious problem upon being
recommended a repair oer is higher; hence, his willingness to pay is higher. When 
is smaller than some threshold  , the expert's prot in Corollary 4 is higher than in
Corollary 2. When  is greater than the threshold  , his prot is higher in Corollary 2
than in Corollary 4. Figure 1 plots both types of expert's prots in the uniform-price and
nonuniform-price equilibria as a function of .
Next, the eciency of the most protable equilibrium as a function of  is analyzed.
Proposition 3. The market eciency is not monotonic in .
Recall that market ineciency is measured as the social loss from an unresolved prob-
lem. When  is less than  , the market is in the nonuniform-price regime. The social
loss is W = (1   )(1   
)(ls   rs), which results from the consumer's rejection of the
serious treatment oered by the selsh expert. When  is above  , the market is in the
uniform-price regime. The social loss is W = (1   )(ls   rs), which results from the
selsh expert's rejection of the treatment for the serious problem.
In both regimes, the minor problem is always repaired and the social loss is due to
an unresolved serious problem. In the nonuniform-price regime, the serious problem is
unresolved with probability (1 
), with 0 < 
 < 1, if the consumer is seeing the selsh
20expert. In the uniform-price regime, the serious problem is unresolved with probability
one if the consumer is seeing the selsh expert. Not surprisingly, the social loss decreases
in  when  <  . It jumps up at  =   and decreases again in  when  >  . Note
when  2 (;), where  = 
, the social loss is higher in a market with conscientious
experts than in a market without conscientious experts. Figure 2 plots the social loss as
a function of .
5 Discussion
In sections 3 and 4, I have analyzed equilibria under the assumption E(l) < rs. Under
the alternative assumption, E(l)  rs, there is a unique equilibrium which is ecient. In
the equilibrium, both types of expert post a single price E(l) and always recommend to
repair the problem at this price; the consumer will accept E(l) with probability one. When
E(l) < rs, a social loss rises in either uniform-price or nonuniform-price equilibria. This
is because the selsh expert cannot credibly commit to always repairing the consumer's
problem at E(l). Although committing to repairing both problems at E(l) allows the
selsh expert to extract the maximum possible social surplus, ex post he always refuses
to repair the serious problem at E(l). When E(l)  rs, the selsh expert's ex ante and
ex post incentives are aligned and, therefore, the equilibrium is ecient.
In the monopoly setting, there is always a social loss resulting from the interaction be-
tween the consumer and the selsh expert. Will the social loss disappear in a competitive
setting? Consider a market with a continuum of experts. The fraction of conscientious
experts is  and the fraction of selsh experts is 1 . Take the same game structure and
allow experts to compete in price lists before a consumer's visit. Assume the condition
E(l) < rs holds and the search cost is high so that the consumer does not search again
after being recommended a treatment oer by an expert. I require a conscientious expert
21to break even ex ante.
The nonuniform-price equilibria cannot be sustained in a competitive market. In
a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the consumer surplus from a repair by a conscientious
expert is higher than a selsh expert. Therefore, in a market with many experts, if the
consumer can infer an expert's type, he will never visit selsh experts. The nonuniform-
price equilibria collapse.
A uniform-price equilibrium outcome may survive under some parameter congura-




ls rs (1 )rm <  < 1, there is
a uniform-price equilibrium outcome. In the equilibrium, each expert posts a single price
equal to the expected treatment cost rs + (1   )rm. Let E(r) denote rs + (1   )rm.
A conscientious expert always recommends this price to a consumer. A selsh expert
recommends this price to a consumer when his problem is minor and refuses to treat the
consumer when the problem is serious. A consumer always accept a repair oer at E(r).
The condition 0 <  < minfrs lm
ls lm; lm rm
rs rm g ensures that price E(r) is smaller than
lm. Hence, a consumer will always accept this repair oer. The driving force behind
this equilibrium is similar as in the monopoly setting. In a competitive setting, a selsh
expert might want to undercut his price to p0 < E(r). Doing so will signal that he is selsh
but he might gain from attracting more consumers. If a consumer visits this deviating
selsh expert, he will enjoy a lower price when his problem is minor. But the consumer
will suer from a higher rejection rate if the problem is serious. When there are enough
conscientious experts, say,
(1 )(rs rm)
ls rs (1 )rm <  < 1, a consumer will never visit an expert
who posts a price lower than E(r). Hence, a selsh expert will not deviate to a lower
price. In this equilibrium, there is still a social loss equal to (1   )(ls   rs).
The result that only the uniform-price equilibrium outcomes might survive in a com-
petitive market implies that price dispersion across problems may decrease in the intensity
of competition. Empirical test about this prediction might be interesting.
226 Conclusion
In this paper, I study credence goods markets with selsh and conscientious experts. I
identify two classes of equilibria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price equilibria.
In uniform-price equilibria, the consumer cannot infer the expert's type from a price
list. The consumer's problem will always be repaired if he is treated by a conscientious
expert. If he is treated by a selsh expert instead, only the minor problem will be resolved;
the serious problem will be rejected by the selsh expert because the price is too low to
cover the treatment cost.
In nonuniform-price equilibria, the consumer can infer the expert's type from the
posted price lists; the conscientious expert posts a single price for dierent repairs whereas
the selsh expert posts two dierent prices. The problem will be always resolved if the
expert is conscientious. If the expert is selsh, the minor problem will be repaired with
probability one but the serious problem will be left unresolved with a positive probabil-
ity. This is because the serious treatment oer is so expensive that the consumer will
sometimes reject it.
Market eciency does not always increase with the fraction of the conscientious expert.
A high fraction of the conscientious expert may induce a free-riding problem; that is, the
selsh expert may overcharge the consumer with a minor problem and dump the consumer
with a serious problem. When the eciency loss caused by the selsh expert exceeds the
eciency gain contributed by the conscientious expert, more conscientious experts reduce
eciency.
I have examined a static model with two types of expert. My future research may
be a study of a dynamic model. In a multiple-period setting, the selsh expert has a
reputation concern which may discipline his current behavior. It may be interesting to
study the selsh expert's pricing and recommendation strategies in dierent periods.
23APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is divided into 4 steps. Step 1 proves that given the
expert's strategy described in Proposition 1, the consumer will always accept the repair
oer. Step 2 describes the consumer's equilibrium strategy following a price deviation.
Step 3 proves that given other players' strategies, the selsh expert's strategy described
in Proposition 1 is optimal. Step 4 shows that given other players' strategies, the consci-
entious expert's strategy is optimal.
Step 1. Upon being recommended a repair oer at p 2 [lm;
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) ], the consumer's
belief of having a serious problem is Pr(li = lsjp) =
Pr(pjli=ls)Pr(li=ls)
Pr(pjli=ls)Pr(li=ls)+Pr(pjli=lm)Pr(li=lm),
where Pr(pjli = ls) and Pr(pjli = lm) stand for the probability that the consumer is rec-
ommended a repair oer at p in state s and m, respectively. According to Proposition 1,
in state s, only the conscientious expert oers to repair the problem at p; in state m, both
types of expert oer to repair the problem at p. Therefore, Pr(pjli = ls) = , the prob-
ability of a conscientious expert, and Pr(pjli = lm) = 1. Consequently, if recommended
p, the consumer has a serious problem with probability Pr(li = lsjp) = 
+(1 ). If the
problem is left unsolved, the consumer's expected loss is therefore
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) . Because
price p is at most
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) , the consumer will accept it.
Step 2. Now I characterize the consumer's equilibrium strategy in the continuation
game following a deviation p0 6= p. If recommended p0 2 (p;ls), the consumer believes with
probability one that he is seeing a selsh expert. In addition, he believes that his problem
is minor for p0 2 (p;rs) and is serious with probability  for p0 2 [rs;ls]. If recommended
p0 2 [rm;p), the consumer believes that he is seeing a conscientious expert and he has a
serious problem with probability . Based on these beliefs, the consumer will only accept
a repair oer p0 2 [rm;p). Accepting a repair oer p0 2 (p;rs) will result in a loss lm   p0;
under assumption E(l) < rs, accepting a repair oer p0 2 [rs;ls] will also result in a loss
24E(l)   p0.
Step 3. The selsh expert.
(i) In the continuation game following p, the selsh expert will make a repair oer at
p only in state m. The assumption E(l) < rs implies
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) < rs. Since p is at most
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) , p < rs. Therefore, the selsh expert will decline to repair the problem at p
in state s. Clearly, p is higher than the minor problem's treatment cost, rm, and therefore
the selsh expert will recommend p in state m.
(ii) The selsh expert will post a uniform price list p 2 [lm;
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) ]. Any deviation
p0 < p is not protable: given that the consumer accepts p with probability one, oering
a price p0 < p will not increase the acceptance probability but will reduce prot. Any
deviation p0 > p will be rejected and result in zero prot.
Step 4. The conscientious expert.
(i) When k  rs
ls, the conscientious expert has a positive payo in both states by
repairing the problem at p. Therefore, he will always oer to repair the problem at p.
(ii) The conscientious expert will post p 2 [lm;
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) ]. The argument is similar
as that in (ii) of step 3. A deviation p0 < p cannot improve acceptance probability but
will result in a lower prot. A deviation p0 > p will be rejected by the consumer and
result in zero payo. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is divided into 4 steps. Step 1 shows that given the
expert's strategy specied in Proposition 2, the consumer's strategy in Proposition 2 is
optimal. Step 2 species the consumer's beliefs and equilibrium strategy after a price
deviation. Step 3 shows that given other players' strategies, the selsh expert's strategy
is optimal. Step 4 shows that given other players' strategies, the conscientious expert's
strategy is optimal.
25Step 1. The consumer's equilibrium response.
(i) The consumer's loss from the problem is at least lm. His surplus from accepting a
repair oer at lm is nonnegative. Hence accepting price lm is the consumer's best response.
(ii) Next, suppose that the consumer is oered a repair at ps 2 [rs;ls]. According to
the selsh expert's strategy in Proposition 2, in state s, he oers to repair the problem at
ps with probability one, and in state m, oers to repair the problem at ps with probability
. Using Bayesian updating, the consumer infers that he has a serious problem with
probability
Pr(li = lsjps) =
Pr(psjli = ls)Pr(li = ls)
Pr(psjli = ls)Pr(li = ls) + Pr(psjli = lm)Pr(li = lm)
;
which says Pr(li = lsjps) = 
+(1 ). So if the problem is left unresolved, the consumer's
expected loss is
ls+(1 )lm
+(1 ) . After substitution by , this expected loss is equal to ps.
The consumer is indierent between accepting or rejecting ps. Therefore, accepting ps
with probability 
 = lm rm
ps rm is a best response.
(iii) Finally, suppose that the consumer is oered a repair price pc. According to the
conscientious expert's strategy in Proposition 2, the consumer retains the prior belief, , of
having a serious problem. When the problem is left unresolved, the consumer's expected
loss is E(l). The assumption E(l) < rs implies that lm + 
1 (ps   rs)(lm rm
ps rm) < E(l).
Because lm + 
1 (ps   rs)(lm rm
ps rm) is the upper bound of pc, the consumer will accept pc
with probability one.
Step 2. The consumer's equilibrium strategy after a price deviation.
Now I characterize the consumer's equilibrium strategy in the continuation game fol-
lowing a price deviation p0 = 2 f(lm;ps)g
S
fpcg. If p0 < pc, the consumer believes that the
expert is conscientious with probability one and the problem is serious with probability
26. If p0 > pc, the consumer believes that the expert is selsh. In addition, he believes
that his problem is minor for p0 2 (pc;rs) and is serious with probability  for p0 2 [rs;ls].
Given his beliefs, the consumer's optimal strategy in the continuation game following p0
is to accept p0 < pc and reject p0 > pc.
Step 3. The selsh expert's equilibrium strategy.
(i) Given other players' strategies, the selsh expert will post a price list (lm;ps);
ps 2 [rs;ls].
First, I show that the selsh expert will not mimic the conscientious expert's price
list. The selsh expert's equilibrium payo is
us(lm;ps) = (ps   rs)(
lm   rm
ps   rm
) + (1   )(lm   rm):
If he mimics the conscientious expert's price list pc 2 [lm;lm + 
1 (ps   rs)(lm rm
ps rm)], the
selsh expert will recommend pc only in state m since pc < rs (step 1 (iii) has shown
this). The highest payo for the selsh expert from pc is us(pc) = (1   )(pc   rm). The
condition pc  lm + 
1 (ps   rs)(lm rm
ps rm) implies us(lm;ps)  us(pc).
Next I show that the selsh expert will not post a price p0 = 2 f(lm;ps)g
S
fpcg. By
step 2, a repair price at p0 < pc will be accepted. However, such a price deviation is less
protable than the selsh expert's equilibrium price list. A repair price at p0 > pc will be
rejected and result in zero prot.
(ii)Given other players' strategies, the selsh expert's recommendation strategy in the
continuation game following (lm;ps) is optimal.
In state s, repairing the problem at ps results in a nonnegative prot
(ps rs)
 = (ps rs)(lm rm
ps rm); whereas, repairing the problem at lm results in a loss lm rs.
In state m, the selsh expert is indierent between oering to repair the problem at
27lm and at ps. The repair oer lm is accepted with probability one and results in a positive
payo lm   rm. The repair oer ps is accepted with probability 
 and results in a payo
(ps   rm):
 = lm   rm.
Step 4. The conscientious expert's equilibrium strategy.
(i) Given other players' strategies, the conscientious expert will post a single price
pc 2 [lm;lm + 
1 (ps   rs)(lm rm
ps rm)].
First I show that the conscientious expert will not mimic the selsh expert's price list.
The conscientious expert's equilibrium payo is uc(pc) = pc+(kls rs)+(1 )(klm rm).
If the conscientious expert mimics the selsh expert's price list (lm;ps), the highest payo
he can obtain is uc(lm;ps) = lm + (kls   rs) + (1   )(klm   rm); this is because when
k is suciently big (more precisely k  rs
ls), the conscientious expert will bear a nancial
loss to repair the consumer's problem. Clearly, uc(pc)  uc(lm;ps).
I now show that the conscientious expert will not post a price p0 = 2 f(lm;ps)g
S
fpcg.
By step 2, a price p0 < pc will be accepted, but is less protable than pc. A price p0 > pc
will be rejected and result in zero payo.
(ii) In the continuation game following pc, the conscientious expert will always oer to
repair the problem at pc. Again, when k is suciently big (k  rs
ls), repairing the problem
at pc results in a positive payo in both states. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 5. In Corollary 2, the selsh expert's prot is s = (1   )(p   rm),
with p =
ls+(1 )lm
+1  . The conscientious expert's prot is c = p   [rs + (1   )rm].
In Corollary 4, the selsh expert's prot is
s = (ls   rs)
lm   rm
ls   rm
+ (1   )(lm   rm):
28The conscientious expert's prot is
c = lm +
(ls   rs)(lm   rm)
(1   )(ls   rm)
  [rs + (1   )rm]:
Both types of expert's prots in Corollary 2 are higher than that in Corollary 4 if
and only if  < rs lm
ls lm and  > 1
(ls lm)(ls rm)
(ls rs)(lm rm) . The condition  < rs lm
ls lm is automatically
satised under the assumption E(l) < rs. Q.E.D.
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